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Abstract: This paper examines the current landscape of 
Hadhrami Arab Community in Indonesia. It aims to 
understand the internal fissures that affect the cohesion 
within the community. Some scholars contended that the 
conflicts taking place within the Hadhrami community are 
due to the Yemeni traditional stratification and nationalist 
orientation during colonial era. However, they do not 
include in their analysis the contemporary state of 
Hadhramis in Indonesia. This paper focuses on the 
contemporary era and argues that doctrinal contest and 
competition for religious authority have dominated the 
dynamics of conflict within Indonesian Hadhrami 
community. The paper will touch on the debates on the 
notion of Shi’ism among the so-called sayyids and Salafism 
among the followers of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah. It suggests 
that it is through these two currents of thought that the 
Hadhrami community in Indonesia not only exercise their 
power and authority, but also shape and transform their 
very identity.  
Keywords: Hadhrami, Conflict, Sunni-Shi’a, Salafi. 
Introduction 
Since the early 20th century, Hadhrami communities in the 
Netherlands East Indies have experienced a changing relationship 
within their own communities. The traditional social stratas, which had 
been transplanted to the Indies from Yemen, came under growing 
challenge. The dispute over the sayyid privileged status divided 
Hadhrami into conservative and reformist groups. Jamiat Khair and 
Rabithah Alawiyah represented the former, while Al-Irsyad represented 
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the latter. These groups continue to exist today. Several scholars have 
analysed the changing identities of Hadhrami community during 
colonial era.1 However, the contemporary relationship within the 
community has attracted few scholars.2 In the contemporary era where 
Hadhrami have become more integrated to Indonesian society, there 
have been few studies on the conflicts taking place within this 
community. The community has currently experienced internal 
division over doctrinal issue due to the influences of Shi’ism and 
Salafism which have infiltrated into the community in the past couple 
decades. The conversion of Hadhrami individuals to Shi’ism has 
caused a division within the sayyid community, just as the influence of 
Salafism has brought a tension among the non-sayyids who affiliated 
with Al-Irsyad. 
This paper explores the current landscape of the Hadhrami 
community by examining the contestation occurring from colonial to 
post-colonial Indonesia. It aims to understand the internal fissures that 
affect the cohesion within the community. It analyses factors that have 
united or divided the community in contemporary Indonesia. It argues 
that while the conflict in the colonial-era centred around the issue of 
Hadhrami traditional hierarchy and nationalist orientation, the current 
conflict has been largely concentrating on the competition of religious 
authority. Such conflict involves those Hadhrami-sayyids who adhere to 
Sunnism and Shi’sm as well as those who belong to al-Irsyad group, i.e 
                                                                
1 See Husain Haikal, Indonesia-Arab dalam Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (1900-1942) 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 1986); Huub de 
Jonge, “Discord and Solidarity Among the Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-
1942,” Indonesia, 55 (April 1930);  Natalie Mobinie-Kesheh, The Hadhrami Awakening: 
Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942 (New York: Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program, 1999). 
2 See for instance Martin Slama, “Indonesian Hadhramis and the Hadhramaut: An Old 
Diaspora and Its New Connections,” Antropologi Indonesia, 29: 1 (2005): pp. 107-113; 
Slama, “Paths of Institutionalization, Varying Divisions, and Contested Radicalism: 
Comparing Hadhrami Communities on Java and Sulawesi,” Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 31: 2 (2011): pp. 331-342; Slama, “Hadhrami Moderns: 
Recurrent Dynamics as Historical Rhymes of Indonesia’s Reformist Islamic 
Organizations Al-Irsyad, in Volker Gottowijk (ed.), Dynamics of Religion in Southeast Asia: 
Magic and Modernity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), pp. 113-133; 
Chaedar S. Bamualim, “Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-
Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and His Islamic Defenders 
Front,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 31: 2 (2011), pp. 
267-281.   
  
Hadhrami in Indonesia 
3 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 11, Number 01, June 2017 
Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah and Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad. Both sayyid and 
Irsyadi feel that their religious and cultural identity has been challenged 
by Shi’a and Salafi, the result of which being that the two groups are 
forced to reassert their very religious and communal identity. 
The first part of this paper provides a short background of 
Hadhramis and their stratification system in Hadhramawt. The second 
part discusses the internal conflict among Hadhrami in the 
Netherlands East Indies that occurred between sayyid and Irsyadi 
communities. The last part examines the current discord within 
Hadhrami communities by comparing internal conflict in both sayyid 
and Irsyadi community. It also analyses factors that caused a friction 
and tension within each Hadhrami group.  
Hadhrami and Social Grouping in Hadhramawt 
Majority of Arab communities in Indonesia originally came from 
Hadhramawt.  Hadhrami society comprises several groups who 
“largely married among themselves, shared a common array of 
occupational statuses, and bore tangible and intangible markers of 
group identification.”3 According to Bujra, stratification is an 
important aspect of the society.4 The stratification system of the 
Hadhrami community divides the population into three general 
stratum based on their descent: the sayyid (or sāda, syeds, alawiyyīn, 
ba’alawi, or habāib); mashāikh (scholars) and qabāil (tribesmen); and the 
masākin (poor) and du’afā’ (weak).5 The top class among the social 
groups is the sayyid. The group consists of people who claim to be 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through the line of his 
grandson Husayn. This group is considered to have the strongest 
lineage and highest religious status in the society.6  
Due to their noble lineage, the sayyid came to be revered in 
Hadhramawt as teachers of Islam, imams (prayer leaders), and 
mediators in tribal conflicts. The sayyid were distinguished symbolically 
from other groups by receiving the honorifics sayyid (literally “master”) 
                                                                
3 Linda Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire: Hadhramaut, Emigration, and the Indian Ocean 
1880s-1930s (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 17. 
4 Abdullah S. Bujra, The Politics of Stratification: The Study of Political Change in a South 
Arabian Town (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.  xiv. 
5 Ibid., p. 13; Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 25. 
6 Bujra, The Politics of Stratification, p. 13. 
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or habib (beloved) for men and sharifa, habiba, or sayyida for women.7 
The community also showed respect by kissing their hands (taqbil) and 
greeting them before others in social and religious settings.8  
The second stratum in Hadhrami society included the mashāikh 
(scholars) and qabāil (tribesmen). Both groups traced their descent 
from a distant ancestor known as Qahtān, the eponymous ancestor of 
the Southern Arab.9 They enjoyed their status as religious elites and 
leaders in Hadhramawt before the coming of sayyids, who displaced 
them as the pre-eminent religious leaders. Qabāil (sing. qabīla) are 
tribesmen who “occupied and controlled most of the countryside, 
carried arms, and were considered less devout.”10 Lineage has defined 
the identity and affiliation of tribal members, and with blood 
connection they are expected to receive mutual support and 
protection.11 This group is also known for the high importance they 
placed on sharaf (honor), which was associated with the ability to bear 
arms and defend one self and one’s family.12 The best example of 
qabāil is the Kāthirī and Qu’aytī, two ruling tribes which competed for 
power in historical Yemen. 
The third level of stratification was occupied by the masākin (poor) 
and du’afā’ (weak). They have neither descent connection to the 
Prophet nor to al-Qahtān. They also had no ancestors who served as 
religious leaders.13 The lowest stratum among all was occupied by ‘abid 
(slaves) who were of African origin and had been brought to Yemen in 
1860s. Some of them served as soldiers under the Qu’aytī and Kāthirī 
sultanate, while others served as household servants under private 
families.14        
                                                                
7 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 25; Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire, p. 
20. 
8 Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire, p. 21. 
9 Anne K. Bang, Sufi and Scholars of the Sea: Family Networks in East Africa 1860-1925 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 13. 
10 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 25. 
11 Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire, p. 25. 
12 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 25, Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire, p. 
26. 
13 Bujra, The Politics of Stratification, p. 14. 
14 Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire, pp. 34-35. 
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Hadhrami and Internal Conflict in Colonial Indonesia 
The identity of the Hadhrami in the Netherland East Indies was 
shaped by social-political factors related to both domestic and global 
developments. The colonial system in Indonesia as well as the spread 
of Islamic reformism in the 20th century influenced the undermining of 
the stratification system of Hadhrami. The sayyid group, who enjoyed 
elevated religious and social status from their fellow Hadhrami and 
local Muslim societies, were caught up in such developments. This 
happened against the backdrop of the Hadhrami awakening (nahdah 
hadhramiyyah) at the dawn of the twentieth century.15 In colonial times, 
the Hadhrami community was categorized as Foreign Orientals and 
considered below the European class, but above the ‘natives’. They 
were also subject to Dutch policies that limited their mobility.16 The 
Hadhrami awakening aimed to bring awareness to Arabs regarding 
social equality and progress by adopting modern ideas and institutions. 
In the early 20th century, the Hadhrami came to assert their belonging 
and allegiance to their homeland, Hadhramawt.17  
There were three modern social institutions that characterized the 
Hahrami awakening: voluntary organisations, modern schools and 
newspapers.18 The earliest enactment of Hadhrami awakening was the 
establishment of the first modern organization for their community, 
Jamiat Khair (the Association for the Good) in Batavia in 1901. The 
founders of the organisation were sayyid, but in the leadership structure 
there were a few non-sayyid. Since the core program of the organisation 
lay in the field of education, they established Islamic schools in Batavia 
and Bogor that adopted a modern approach with text books, and 
Western sciences, as well maintaining the teaching of traditional 
religious subjects.19 To ensure the quality of religious studies and 
Arabic, they recruited a number of teachers from the Middle East.20   
                                                                
15 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 34. 
16 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 79. 
17 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 34 
18 Mobini-Kesheh, “Islamic Modernism in Colonial Java: The Al-Irshad Movement,” 
in Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith, Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and 
Statesmen in The Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 233. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), p. 
69. 
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Discord among Hadhramis started when teachers recruited from 
the Middle East came to teach in the Jamiat Khair School. The most 
influential figure was the Sudanese Ahmad Surkati who had studied 
and taught in Mecca. During his long stay in Mecca, Surkati adopted 
the Egyptian ideas of Islamic reformism and became active in the 
modernist movement.21 The idea of Islamic reformism was propagated 
by Egyptian reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) at a 
time when the Muslim world was largely under European colonialism. 
The main aspiration of this movement was to reform Islam from 
within, arguing that the decline of Islamic civilization was due to the 
degeneration and corruption of Islam. It therefore promoted a return 
to the poor sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Hadith, while adopting 
the modern development.22 Surkati came to take up a position as 
inspector of Jamiat Khair schools, thereby contributing to the growth 
of the schools. He and other intellectuals infused the spirit of Islamic 
reformism in the schools. His reformist view became the immediate 
cause of conflict within the Hadhrami society. In 1912, he went to 
Solo to visit his friend, Awad Sungkar Al-Urmei. In a meeting with his 
friend he was told about a female sayyid (sharifa) in Solo who lived with 
a Chinese man outside marriage due to economic reasons. Surkati 
suggested helping the sharifa by separating her from her partner and 
seeking a Muslim man to marry her. Asked about the marriage status 
between a sharifa and a non-sayyid, he pronounced that such marriage is 
allowed according to Islamic law.23 On another occasion, he criticized 
the practice of hand kissing for sayyids and attacked what he saw as the 
self-exaltation and delusion of their holiness.24 His views aroused 
indignation among conservative sayyid leaders of Jamiat Khair in 
Batavia eventually forcing Surkati to resign from his position in Jamiat 
Khair. 25 
                                                                
21 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 81; Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 54. 
22 Oliver Leaman, The Biographical Encyclopaedia of Islamic Philosophy (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2006), p. 108. 
23 Hussein Badjerei, Al-Irsyad Mengisi Sejarah Bangsa (Jakarta: Presto Prima Utama, 
1996), pp. 28-29. 
24 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 81. 
25 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 55. 
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The resignation of Surkati triggered a deeper division within the 
Hadhrami community and led to the creation of new Hadhrami 
organisation with a reformist outlook. He gained support mostly from 
non-sayyids. Persuaded by reform-minded Hadhrami, most notably the 
Arab kapitein (a community leader appointed by the Dutch) Syaikh 
Umar Yusuf Umar Manggus, Surkati cancelled his intention to return 
to Mecca and later founded his own school, Madrasah al-Irsyad al-
Islamiyyah (Islamic School for Guidance).26 Following this, in 1914 
Surkati and his friends established an organisation for supporting the 
operation of the schools under the name Jam’iyyah al-Islāh wa al-
Irsyād al-‘Arabiyyah (Arab Association for Reform and Guidance).27 
Echoing the reformist movement in Egypt, Al-Irsyad sought to purify 
Islam of superstition and innovations as result of its interaction with 
localities, and return to the religious foundation i.e. the Qur’an and the 
Hadith. At the Arab community level, the organisation strove to 
abolish the traditional Hadhrami stratification system that was 
inherited from Hadhramawt.28  
The rapid development of Al-Irsyad and its continuing challenge 
to sayyids created a long period of hostility between them. Established 
in Batavia, Al-Irsyad spread rapidly to other cities in Java and islands of 
the Indies. As a response to the success of Al-Irsyad, in 1927 several 
sayyid established an organisation for their community called Rabithah 
Alawiyah, the Union of the Descendants of the Prophet. This 
organisation opposed attempts by the Irsyadis (followers of Al-Irsyad) 
to remove privilege position of the sayyid.29  Rabithah has an institution 
called al-Maktab al-Dāimi (Daily Office) which serves to preserve sayyid 
history and record their genealogy. In 1940, the institution recorded 
17,764 sayyid with their genealogies from various parts of Indonesia. 30 
The different stance between Al-Irsyad and Rabithah Alawiyah led 
them to oppose each other either through words or actions. Their 
                                                                
26 Badjerei, Al-Irsyad Mengisi, p. 32; Bisri Affandi, Syaikh Ahmad Syurkati (1874-1943): 
Pembaharu dan Pemurni Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 1999), p. 13. 
27 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 56. 
28 Huub de Jonge, “Abdul Rahman Baswedan and the Emancipation of the Hadhramis 
in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Social Science, 32: 3 (2004), p. 378; Deliar Noer, Partai 
Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1987), p. 12. 
29 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 378. 
30 Rabithah Alawiyah, AD-ART Rabithah Alawiyah. n.d. 
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debates were published in Arabic papers, pamphlets, and brochures 
where each group defended their position and attacked their rival.31 
The debate revolved around three main areas of Hadhrami custom: 
“the kissing of sayyid’s hands, the ban on marriage between a sayyid's 
daughter and a non-sayyid, and the use of the title “sayyid”.32 Mobini-
Kesheh (1999) observed that the debate over sayyid status was 
expressed in terms of Hadhrami-ness. In this sense, each group 
claimed that they were more Hadhrami than others. To the sayyids, 
obedience to the traditional stratification system was the essence of 
Hadhrami identity, while for non-sayyids the tradition was imposed by 
sayyid whom they regard as “intruders” to Hadhrami society. In this 
regard, Irsyadis sought to be ‘modern’ while maintaining their 
Hadhrami identity.33 A culminating point of the debate was the 
decision of Al-Irsyad to desacralize the title “sayyid”. Al-Irsyad's 
congress in 1931 in Batavia decided that the title sayyid was not 
exclusive to a particular group (sayyids) but could be addressed to 
anyone who deserves espect, regardless their lineage. For them, the 
title “sayyid” should be equated to “mister” or “sir” in general use. By 
this, Al-Irsyad suggested that any person has the right to use such a 
tittle. This decision appalled the sayyids who feared the loss of their 
aristocratic privileges.34 The sayyids fiercely rejected the idea and argued 
that “the title “sayyid” was long established by custom in Hadhramawt, 
in the Indies, and other parts of the Islamic world”.35 Moreover, they 
contended that the title had to be preserved in order to follow Islamic 
law that especially applies to descendants of the Prophet, such as the 
law of kafa’ah (equivalence) in marriage. The title was important for 
sayyid because it could remind their offspring to undertake their 
religious responsibility in societies.36 The polemic between the two 
groups resulted in serious riots and violence. In Bondowoso, for 
instance, several Irsyadi who pushed forward during prayer in a 
mosque were killed by sayyids.37  
                                                                
31 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 82. 
32 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 92. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 82. 
35 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 105. 
36 Ibid., p. 106. 
37 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 84. 
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Both sayyids and Irsyadis petitioned the Dutch Government on the 
issue of sayyid status. The sayyids, under the Rabithah organisation, 
sought legal recognition of their title, but the Irsyadi asked the 
government to be neutral in the conflict by rejecting the sayyid’s 
demands. The government finally decided that it would not fulfill the 
sayyid’s wishes. The conflict was finally over due to the role of new 
generation of sayyids who preferred to focus on the issue of education 
rather than extending their battle with Irsyadi.38 In the meantime, 
younger generation Irsyadis, along with some progressive sayyid who 
were born in Indonesia (muwallad), opposed the division within 
Hadhrami community and sought to integrate them into Indonesian 
society by establishing the Persatoean Arab Indonesia (PAI), the 
Union of Indonesian Arabs.39 
 
Internal Divisions and Growing Sectarianism 
The Current Sunni-Shi’a Division within Sayyid Community 
The friction within the Hadhrami-sayyid community at the present 
is among others due to the issue of Shi’ism. This tension has occurred 
at both the leadership and grassroots level. However, the dispute 
among sayyid leaders is more exposed in media than from the 
grassroots. Several sayyid told me that the doctrinal tension occurred in 
the community due to the rising Shi’ism in Indonesia in the wake of 
Iranian revolution in 1979. The charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
is also a sayyid, with his success in leading the revolution, made him an 
appealing figure among sayyid community in Indonesia. He was 
regarded as a brave Muslim scholar and leader who opposed a tyrant 
government, back up by US, only through sermons and brochures.40 A 
popular preacher in Malang, Habib Jamal b. Ba’agil, told me that the 
conversion of young Hadhramis to Shi’ism was also due to the absence 
of ulama idols from Hadhramawt who could become reference for 
Hadhrami-sayyids in 1980s and 1990s.41 This was the result of the 
severing of ties between Indonesia and Yemen after the Socialist won 
power in Sana’a from 1967 to 1990. This affected the conversion of 
young generations of sayyid to Shi’a. This was clear for instance, from 
                                                                
38 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 107. 
39 Jonge, Discord and Solidarity, p. 86. 
40 Interview with Hasan Daliel Alaydrus, Jakarta, 28 January 2013. 
41 Interview with Habib Jamal b. Ba’agil, Malang, 25 March 2013. 
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the story of Husein Shahab, who went to study in Iran several months 
after the revolution. His initial motivation to study in Qum was more 
educational than doctrinal. In time, though, he converted to Shi’ism.42  
Conversion to Shi’ism has increased among Hadrami, as well 
Indonesians in general, after the return of the graduates from Iran. 
Many of them became preachers and writers, and founded Shi’ite 
educational institutions and religious learning centres. As Zulkifli has 
rightly observed, the majority of students at the Shi’i YAPI pesantren in 
Bangil have been dominated by Indonesian Arabs.43 
The growing conversion of young sayyids to Shi’ism caused 
deepening concerns in Sunni-Shafi’i Hadhrami community. Some 
habaib told me that the Shi’a issue has led to disputes and splits within 
sayyid families. There are cases of Sunni parents repudiating their 
children who converted to Shi’ism. Several divorces also happened 
when one spouse found the other had converted to Shi’ism.44 Sayyid 
families who are tolerant to Shi’ism or seek to maintain harmony 
within their family tend to be silent on the matter if they know that 
one of their family members are Shi’a. In organisational and 
educational settings, tension also occurred. The leader of Ahlul Bayt 
Indonesia (ABI), one of the main Shi’ite organisations in Indonesia, 
Habib Hasan Dalil al-Aydarus, was fascinated with Ayatollah 
Khomeini when he, along with his Sunni colleague, Habib Rizieq 
Shihab, studied in Saudi Arabia. Upon returning to Indonesia, he 
dedicated himself to teaching at his former school, Jamiat Khair in 
Jakarta. However, when the school’s principal and teachers found that 
he had ‘converted’ to Shi’ism, he was denounced and eventually 
resigned.45 Habib Hasan later established Ahlul Bayt Indonesia 
together with his Shi’i friends.    
 
Albayyinat and Anti-Shi’a 
The vast majority of sayyid religious scholars and preachers in 
Indonesia maintain that their ancestors are Sunni. They emphasize that 
                                                                
42 Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2013), pp. 61-
62. 
43 Ibid., p. 144. 
44 Interview with Syafiq, Jakarta, 12 August 2015; Muhammad Alwi Al-Kaff, Jakarta, 
13 August 2015. 
45 Interview with Syauqi, Jakarta, 2 February 2013. 
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Sunni Islam is an integral part to the identity of Hadhrami sayyid ever 
since their ancestor’s migration to Indonesia and until now. They 
regard Shi’a a new and disturbing development among sayyid. Most 
preachers I met argue that Shi’a is a deviant sect within Islam. In 
countering Shi’ism, most Sunni habaib prefer to focus on peaceful 
preaching and education rather than through a public agitation or 
vigilante action. Claiming to follow the ethics of the Tarīqa ‘Alawiyyah 
(‘Alawi spiritual path), most habaib prefer not to mention their Shi’a 
rivals by name in their sermon. However, some habaib do openly 
oppose Shi’ism in their preaching and writings.  
Habaib’s resistance to Shi’ism took a tangible form with the 
establishment of Albayyinat in 1988. This movement was founded by 
several habaib in Java including Habib Ahmad b. Zein Al-Kaff of 
Surabaya, Habib Thohir b. Abdullah Al-Kaff of Tegal, Habib Abdul 
Qadir Al-Haddad of Malang, and Habib Ahmad Assegaf of Bangil.46 
Although it was founded in 1988, its name began to appear in public 
after the fall of the New Order. Its website stated that the emergence 
of the group was driven by the growing development of Shi’ism in 
Indonesia bringing religious teaching that had ‘deviated’ from the 
Prophet’s teaching.47 It asserted Shi’is condemn and insult the 
Companions of the Prophet. Albayyinat calls itself Sunni group that 
seeks to protect Sunni Muslims from the spread of Shi’ism. Despite 
the various types of Shi’ism, Albayyinat regards it as single face which 
is all deviant and, therefore, an enemy of Islam. The group’s activities 
focus on socialization and preaching on the danger of Shi’a through 
publications and the internet, trainings, seminars, and sermons. The 
group has also built a collaboration with Muslims organisations, either 
traditionalist or Salafi, in opposing Shi’ism. Despite their limited 
activity, Albayyinat’s voice is getting louder in media and has 
contributed in inciting intolerance and violence to Shi’a community.                 
The chairman of Albayyinat, Habib Achmad b. Zein Al-Kaff, has 
sharply criticized Shi’as and condemned Muslim leaders who he sees as 
tolerant to Shi’ism, including habaib. He has been constantly invited by 
various organisations, whether traditionalist or reformist to give anti-
Shi’a talks and cadre training. He appealed to the solidarity of all Sunni 
                                                                
46 Interview with Habib Achmad b. Zein Al-Kaff, Surabaya, 13 March 2013. 
47 See Albayyinat. (n.d.). “Apa dan Siapa Albayyinat”, available at < http://www.albay-
yinat.net/ind1.html>  accessed on 20 October 2014.  
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Muslims, including the Salafis, to fight against Shi’a as a common 
enemy. Not only attacking the Shi’i leaders and their institutions, he 
also criticizes moderate Muslims who seek to build a harmony with 
Shia.  
 
Attacks against Fellow Habaib 
Criticizing and denouncing fellow habaib publicly is a recent 
phenomenon among habaib in Indonesia. This is largely due to 
theological issues. Habib Achmad of Albayyinat is a good case on this 
matter. In several public sermons and seminars, Habib Achmad 
strongly criticized fellow habaib who have converted to Shi’ism. He 
regards this phenomenon as a blight on sayyid community. He argues 
that Sunnism is the core identity of habaib since their earliest ancestor 
in Yemen, Ahmad b. Isa al-Muhajir. In a seminar entitled “Why Shi’a 
are not Muslim” on February 2014 in Surakarta, Habib Achmad stated 
“if there are habaib becoming Shi’i, (it means) they have become 
traitors to their ancestor (the Prophet). If they do not live according to 
the path of ‘Alawiyyin, they then are not habaib anymore”.48 In my 
interview, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Rabithah Alawiyah 
which he accused of not serious in countering Shi’ism, despite its 
adherence to the religious principles of Sunni Islam. He urges the 
Rabithah to adopt the anti-Shi’i program that Albayyinat proclaims. He 
suspects that its failure to tackle Shi’sm is due to the fact that some 
Rabithah leaders have Shi’a relatives. He mentioned the case of the 
general chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah, Habib Zen Umar b. Smith, 
who has a Shi’a brother-in-law, a famous religious singer, Haddad 
Alwi.49 
One of Habib Achmad’s targets is the famous Muslim scholar and 
the prolific writer Professor Quraish Shihab, who is a sayyid. Quraish is 
a former rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) of 
Jakarta (1992-1998) and a former Minister of Religious Affairs (1998). 
He pursued Islamic studies at the Al-Azhar University, Egypt, from 
                                                                
48 Kiblat. “Habib Zein Al-Kaff: Habib yang Jadi Syiah Pengkhianat Rasulullah”, 
available at <http://www.kiblat.net/2014/02/03/habib-zein-al-kaff-habib-yang-jadi-
syiah-pengkhianat-rasulullah/> accessed on 7 June 2015.  Habib Achmad’s talks and 
interviews on Shi’ism is often exposed by conservative online media such as 
www.kiblat.net., www.voa-islam.com., www.arrahmah.com., www.hidayatullah.com., 
www.eramuslim.com., and www.antiliberalnews.com.      
49 Interview with Habib Achmad b. Zein Al-Kaff, Surabaya, 13 March 2013. 
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undergraduate to doctoral level. Although Quraish is a descendant of 
the Prophet, he avoids using the tittle habib and does not wear specific 
clothing that identifies him as habib.50 Quraish is popularly known as a 
moderate ulama whose views and works have a wide appeal to many 
Muslims in Indonesia. He has produced numerous books on Islam and 
a complete volume of Qur’anic exegesis (Kitab Tafsir). Despite his 
moderate views, aspects of his thought have been criticized by Islamist 
and conservative groups in Indonesia.  One of those is his Sunni-Shi’i 
Holding Hands: Is it Possible?¸ a book he writes to bridge the Sunnis and 
Shi’is.51 It examines the similarities and differences in terms of 
theological doctrines between the two groups. For Quraish, the 
difference between them is not significant, and therefore, he advocates 
unity and enjoins Indonesian Sunni Muslims to live in harmony with 
Shi’a. Habib Achmad condemned this idea of bridging (taqrib), and 
argued that Shi’as are non-Muslims due to their incorrect theology. He 
likens Sunni and Shi’a to water and oil that can never mix. This was 
due to the sharp differences between the two in both doctrinal pillars 
(ushul) and branches (furu’). Habib Achmad suspects that the project of 
reconciling the two groups is part of a hidden Shi’a agenda aimed at 
taking over the Sunni majority in Indonesia. He also suspects that 
Quraish already was approached and funded by the Shi’is through their 
generous projects.52   
Another target of Habib Achmad’s criticism was the great leader 
(imam besar) of Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), 
Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab. Habib Rizieq, with his FPI, has 
acquired notoriety as a radical figure who fights against immorality and 
threats to Islam. He has been very critical of liberal Muslim thinkers 
and several groups considered as deviant such as Ahmadiyah. Despite 
his militant views and actions, Habib Rizieq still considers Shi’a as part 
of Islam. He divides Shi’i into two groups: the moderate Shi’i (mu’tadil) 
and the extremist Shi’i (ghulat). For Habib Rizieq, in spite of their high 
respect to Ali, the former group does not condemn the Companions 
of the Prophet and His wife, Aisha. They also do not attack Sunni 
Muslims in public. Moderate Shi’a, for him, are not deviant and are still 
                                                                
50 Interview with Muhammad Quraish Shihab, Jakarta, 22 August 2013. 
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within the straight path of Islam. However, for the second group, he 
considers it deviant since they condemn the companions of the 
Prophet and Aisha and readily attack Sunni Muslims in their 
sermons.53 Despite Habib Rizieq’s criticism of ‘extreme’ Shi’a, he is 
still denounced by Habib Achmad, particularly for his attitude 
regarding the moderate Shi’is, and for his willingness to have Shi’i give 
sermons in his house.54  
Since Albayyinat is a minor group it does not represent the habaib’s 
radical attitude to Shi’ism. The organisation has no headquarter, clear 
structure, and mass-following, nor systematic mass mobilization. Most 
of anti-Shi’a campaign is expressed through sermons and books mostly 
by Habib Achmad. Although many Sunni habaib reject Shi’a, they do 
not express their rejection through public agitation and violence. They 
prefer to strengthen the Sunni belief of their community in order to 
protect them from Shi’a influences. However, Habib Achmad is 
popular among conservative habaib and Islamists especially with regard 
to his strong anti-Shi’ism.   
Despite its organizational limit, anti-Shi’a campaign has helped to 
stigmatize and provoke violence towards Shi’is. One instance of their 
involvement in inciting hate and violence was the mob attack on 
Ponpes Darul Sholihin owned by Habib Ali b. Umar al-Habsyi, in 
Jember, East Java on 11 September 2013. This attack, however, was 
not mobilized by Albayyinat leaders. The attack was driven by the 
allegation that the pesantren had spread Shi’ism to its students. Habib 
Ali clarified that he and his teachers did not spread Shi’ism, but only 
taught Sufism and undertake healing practice in the pesantren.55 The 
Commission for the Disappearance and Victims of Violence (Kontras) 
found in the field that the false accusation was driven by competition 
and envy on the side of several local ustadz (religious preachers and 
teachers) in the area due to the success of Habib Ali in managing the 
pesantren and expanding its building facilities. The source from Shi’i 
                                                                
53 Interview with Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, Jakarta, 4 April 2013. 
54 Interview with Habib Achmad b. Zein Al-Kaff, Surabaya, 13 March 2013. 
55 Kontras. “Desakan Penyidikan Komprehensif Kasus Penyerangan Pondok Pesan-
tren Darul Sholihin, Puger, Jember, Jawa Timur”, available at <http://www.kontras.-
org/home/index.php?module=pers&id=1774> accessed on 7 June 2015. See also 
Republika. “Kontras Desak Penyelidikan Kasus Penyerangan Ponpes”, available at 
<http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/13/09/21/mtg6nx-kontras-
desak-penyelidikan-kasus-penyerangan-ponpes> accessed on 8 July 2015. 
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media, few blogs, and videos on Youtube informed that Habib 
Muhdhor al-Hamid, a vocal anti-Shi’i habib from Jember who is 
affiliated to Albayyinat, was involved in inciting the violence.56 It was 
reported that local preachers, who were hostile to Habib Ali, facilitated 
a public gathering several months before the incident and invited anti-
Shi’a habaib from Albayyinat including Habib Achmad b. Zein Al-Kaff 
of Surabaya and Habib Muhdhor al-Hamid of Jember to give sermons 
on the danger of Shi’a to local Muslims. However, it cannot be proven 
whether their sermons were the major drive for the pesantren mob 
attack. In fact, the mastermind behind the attack was local preachers 
who facilitated Albayyinat leaders to give sermons on anti-Shi’ism.  
The growing anti-Shi’a campaign by some habaib has not resulted 
in a larger conflict between Sunni and Shi’a within the sayyid 
community. The main reason is that sayyid community has been 
divided among themselves in responding to Shi’ism. The Rabithah 
Alawiyah itself has not declared officially that it rejects Shi’ism. Shi’a 
sayyids are tolerated to attend the Rabithah’s social and religious events, 
although none of them have positions in the Rabithah.  As the 
minority, the Shi’a leaders and scholars tend to use defensive strategy 
by clarifying perceived misunderstanding of Shi’ism and put forward 
the common platform and unity among Muslims. Their attempt has 
been also supported by moderate Sunni scholars such as Quraish 
Shihab and religious leaders from the Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah.  
 
The Split of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah 
Over the past decade, Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah has been divided into 
two camps: Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah and Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad. The 
former claims to be guard that maintains the original modernist spirit 
of the organisation, while the latter is the conservative faction, which is 
influenced by Salafi seeking to bring purification and more 
professional management within the organisation. I argue that while 
the leadership rivalry is the cause for the division, the more 
fundamental reason for the conflict is actually the contest for authority 
between the modernists and the young conservatives, each of which 
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does represent the teaching of the founder of Al-Irsyad, Imam Ahmad 
Surkati.  
 
Leadership Divide: A Chronology 
The leadership conflict started in the mid-1990s. This was driven 
by the dissatisfaction of a group of Irsyadis toward the leadership of 
Geys Amar who had been a three-time chairman since 1982. The anti-
Geys group wanted regeneration and religious purification in the 
organisation. At the Al-Irsyad congress in 1996 in Pekalongan, Geys 
Amar ran again for the chairmanship. His only rival, Muhammad 
Bawazir, withdrew the election in order to avoid conflict with Geys. 
Geys automatically won the vote for another term. Geys felt under 
pressure by some of his executive board whom he considered fanatics 
and trouble makers in the organization.57 Geys, therefore, in 1998 
purged more than ten executive members, including his deputy 
chairman, Muhammad Bawazir. This removal led to the dissident 
group to hold an extraordinary congress in Tawangmangu, Central 
Java, on October 1999, resulting in the formation of a new rival Al-
Irsyad leadership. The newly elected chairman was Farouk Zein 
Bajabir. In the following year, the Geys’ camp held a 37th congress in 
Bandung in which Hisyam Thalib was elected as the new leader while 
Geys became General Secretary.  
Given that there were two leaderships of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah, 
there was an attempt by the two groups at reconciliation through 
mediation. They agreed to organize a joint congress in Cilacap in 2002. 
In the congress, the majority of participants voted for Farouk from the 
conservative group. However, the old-guard was angered by their 
defeat. They regarded the congress unconstitutional and refused to 
accept the result. Both appealed to the high court in East Jakarta to 
validate their legal status. In 2004 the court ruled in favor of the 
modernists and declared the 2002 congress in Cilacap invalid. After 
their defeat, the conservatives established a new organisation called 
“Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad” (Al-Irsyad Association) by modifying the 
name and the flag of the organisation. The organisation has been 
registered by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights through a 
ministerial decision in 2013. Until then, there have been continuous 
attempts from both sides for reconciliation, with no avail.  
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Stagnation, Irsyadi Identity, and Revival through Doctrinal 
Revitalisation 
Both the old modernist and the young conservative share a similar 
concern with Al-Irsyad’s stagnation. Compared to another modernist 
organisation, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad has experienced a very little 
organisational expansion or increase in the number of educational 
institutions and quality of its education. In 2009, Al-Irsyad has only 
132 branches across 23 provinces, 8 hospitals in various cities, and 140 
educational institutions from kindergarten to high schools.58 According 
to Slama, the limited expansion of Al-Irsyad is due to its failure “in 
recruiting substantial numbers of Indonesian Muslims from outside the 
Hadhrami community and is still widely perceived as an ‘Arab’ 
organization”.59 Besides, Al-Irsyad schools also show poor performan-
ce compared to other Islamic schools due to the lack of human resour-
ces, limited support from Hadhrami community, and the lack of 
Irsyadi orientation in its curriculum.60 For the insiders however, Al-
Irsyad’s decline was deemed to be the direct result of the lack of 
ideological adherence within the organisation and in its educational 
orientation. Put in different ways, many Irsyadis do not teach and 
implement the values of “Irsyadi ideology” at both organisations and 
education.           
The two groups seek to revive the golden age of the organisation 
and its educational institutions as developed by Ahmad Surkati. They 
believe that Al-irsyad has been in crisis, especially in terms of the 
ideological principles and the mastery of Arabic and Islamic studies. 
Some leaders told me that many young Irsyadis now no longer 
implement and understand Al-Irsyad’s principles (mābadi’). Moreover, 
many young Irsyadis no longer comprehend Arabic and acquire 
Islamic knowledge. Therefore, there is a growing concern among 
Irsyadi leaders to revive the identity and skills of the Irsyadis.  
The old Al-Irsyad leaders argue that the big challenge of the 
organisation is the doctrine of Salafi-Wahhabi. They believe that they 
                                                                
58 58Al-Irsyad. “Al-Irsyad Tidak Haramkan Pemilu dan Kafirkan Anggota DPR”, 
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59 Slama. “Hadhrami Moderns”, p. 121. 
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are too many Irsyadis studied at Salafi educational institutions in 
Jakarta, such as the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies (Lembaga 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab/LIPIA). Some LIPIA 
graduates continued their study in Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen and Afghanistan. At these institutions, they were influenced by 
the Salafi-Wahhabi teachings. Geys stated: 
Those (Irsyadis) who studied in the Middle East -wittingly or not- 
were influenced by Wahhabi thought. This could be seen from the 
way they pray and the style of their clothes and appearance such 
as wearing trousers right to their ankles (isbāl), having long beards, 
and their wives wearing black veil. They behave as if the truth is 
only on their side.61  
Noorhaidi Hasan’s study on Salafi movement in Indonesia 
discovers that several leading Salafi leaders in Indonesia were 
Hadhrami Arabs and some of them were previously educated in Al-
Irsyad schools.62 According to the old Al-Irsyad leaders, when these 
young Hadhramis returned to Indonesia, they became active members 
and injected more conservative views that differ radically from 
traditional Irsyadi principles. For instance, these youths prefer to use 
ru’ya (sighting moon) instead of hisāb (modern calculation) on 
determining the coming day of Ramadhan month. Many of them also 
tend to segregate men and women in Al-Irsyad’s events. For senior 
Irsyadi leaders, their views and attitudes were puritanical and contained 
seeds of radicalism and possibly terrorism. They regard their religious 
understanding as contrary to Irsyadi principles that teach adaptation to 
modernity.63 Geys Amar asserted that the conservative group tried to 
inject their Wahhabi teaching into young Irsyadis and hijack the 
organisation by running for leadership positions. In fact, the reason 
why he sacked more than ten executive members in 1998 from the 
organization was that because they bring in problems into the body.64   
The old camp leaders feel that there are external and internal 
factors for the penetration of Wahhabism into the organization. The 
external factor has to do with the expansion of Salafism in Indonesia 
                                                                
61 Gatra 26, 7 May 2009. 
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64 Interview with Geys Amar, Jakarta, 11 February 2013. 
  
Hadhrami in Indonesia 
19 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 11, Number 01, June 2017 
through generous Saudi funding. According to Geys Amar, the 
Wahhabi infiltration came in through Saudi donation via the Religious 
Attaché of Saudi Arabia embassy in Jakarta. Donations were delivered 
to schools, pesantren, and mosques owned by Al-Irsyad. They also 
provide scholarships to those wanting to study Arabic course and 
Islamic studies in Indonesia, such as LIPIA, and to those who want to 
study in Saudi Arabia.65 I observed that several Irsyadis who studied in 
Saudi-funded institutions have become prominent preachers within the 
Salafi community in Indonesia. They include Yusuf Usman Baisa (the 
current chairman of the Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad, Farid Ahmad Okbah 
(the former member of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad),66 and Ja’far Umar 
Thalib (the former principal of Al-Irsyad school in Tengaran and the 
founder of Laskar Jihad).  
The second factor is to do with the puritan nature of the 
organisation and the lack of Irsyadi identity. One Irsyadi leader, Said 
Sungkar, said that it is understandable why Irsyadis easily moved to 
Wahhabi groups as both have similar ideals of religious puritanism, i.e 
returning to the Qur’an and Hadith. But while the Salafis are heavily 
reliant on religious texts, and thus rigid and textual, the Irsyadis are 
willing –despite being textual- to take into account external factors 
such as social reality and science in understanding the texts. He gives 
slavery as an example. For the Salafis –in contrast to the Irsyadis- 
slavery is legal based on religious texts.67  
Furthermore, younger Irsyadis seem uninterested in the 
organisation’s identity and established ideology. Since Indonesian 
independence, the government demanded all schools, including Al-
Irsyad, to use Indonesian language as the primary language in learning 
activities. This affected Al-Irsyad schools which used Arabic as their 
main language. This was exacerbated by the fact that the founder of 
the organisation, Ahmad Surkati, did not leave obvious works that 
could become a doctrinal foundation. Unlike Muhammadiyah, Al-
Irsyad schools do not provide a particular subject related to the 
ideological principles that will become point of reference in their 
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religious view and practice. Moreover, the ‘secular’ subjects are now 
more dominant than the religious ones because of the demands 
imposed by the government’s national guidelines.68 In dealing with this 
situation, Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah has recently published a manual 
containing the organisation’s principles and their explanation for 
Irsyadis aiming at strengthening their identity. The manual covers the 
source of Islamic law, aqīdah/tauhīd (theology), ibādah (religious 
devotion), akhlāk (ethics), al-musāwa (egalitarianism), knowledge, and 
modernity.69 To illustrate their approach in asserting their ideology, the 
chairman of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah, Abdullah Jaidi stated in his 
foreword of the book: 
Today, foreign thoughts have infiltrated the environment of Al-
Irsyad. The thoughts seem not in line with the mabādi’ (principles) 
we hold. This infiltration takes two forms. The first is that which 
brings a stagnant condition (jumud) in which people only rely on 
the past and use taqlid (blind following), while the other is that 
which inclines toward liberal thought and could uproot us from 
our religious and historical values…Therefore, the central leaders 
of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah think that it is important to revive the 
identity (jati diri) of al-Irsyad by enhancing its mabādi’, which serves 
as the ideology of organisation, as well as developing the 
understanding of Islam which is adaptive and in line with the spirit 
of the changing time.70   
Such statement is indicative of the old Al-Irsyad’s worries 
concerning the advent of new thoughts perceived as a challenge to 
their religious identity. Abdullah classified two kinds of foreign 
thoughts that his organization should anticipate namely conservatism 
and liberalism. Although Abdullah did not specify what he means by 
these two streams of thought, it is clear that the former refers to 
Salafism, while the latter to liberal Islam. The book was published 
partly to avoid the previous precedent where young Irsyadis were 
influenced by Saudi Salafism. In terms of his rejection of liberal Islam, 
Abdullah has the same view with the young Al-Irsyad although his 
camp itself was accused of being liberal. In this context, liberal Islam is 
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defined as that which prefers rationality over the normative doctrines 
of Islam. The mabādi’, Abdullah hopes can provide guideline for the 
young Irsyadis in grasping the Al-Irsyad ideological principles and 
protecting them from foreign influences.   
The rival executive board, Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad, sees leadership 
and doctrinal problem as the cause of the conflict. The leadership 
problem in their view lay in the style of leadership of Geys Amar, who 
was too dominant and not accommodative to young Irsyadi 
aspirations. As Geys had occupied four periods of leadership from 
1982 to 2000, he was seen as resistant to organisational regeneration 
and innovation. The Perhimpunan group sees itself as idealists who 
have fought to improve the organisation through more professional 
management and the maintenance of Irsyadi basic principles (mabadi).71 
Before the conflict, the Chairman Deputy, Muhammad Bawazir, and 
several executive members proposed to improve the organisation 
through the adoption of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and 
spelling out the authority and rights of chairman and other members. 
Geys approved this idea but later reneged, believing that the new rules 
limited his leadership. He felt under pressure and later removed several 
executive members. The Perhimpunan camp considered the reshuffle 
as the Amar’s move to secure his position from internal threats.72  
Apart from leadership issues, the Perhimpunan group also objects 
the doctrine of the main Al-Irsyad’s camp. They reject accusation that 
they are Wahhabis who have radical understanding of Islam. They 
regard such accusation as slanderous and a vilification of their group. 
They fought back by stating that the old group is too loose in 
upholding and implementing religion.73 Yusuf suspected that the old 
camp was influenced by the ideas of liberalism and pluralism on the 
ground that the adapt to social reality and modernity in interpreting the 
religious texts. In Yusuf’s view, the old leaders tend to favor hedonism 
(hura-hura) by mixing the interaction of men and women in Al-Irsyad’s 
program activities and wedding parties. For the Perhimpunan camp, 
this contradicts the Al-Qur’an and Hadith. The Perhimpunan group, 
therefore, has sought to revive religious purification in the organization 
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by reminding the Irsyadis to uncompromisingly uphold the Qur’an and 
Hadith through education and dakwah. Yusuf regards the spirit of 
purification was the important principle of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah laid 
down by the founder Ahmad Surkati. He sees the common platform 
between Al-Irsyad and Salafis in terms of ideology.74  
Yusuf’s puritanical views and his close connection to Salafi group 
indicate that he is a Salafi. His salafi inclination is clear on several 
grounds. Firstly, he follows the conservative views in several aspects. 
One of them is the strict segregation between men and women in 
public activities. I observed that he and several members of 
Perhimpunan also follow Salafi style of clothing such as wearing 
trousers right to their ankles (isbāl). Moreover, he regards Al-Irsyad as a 
Salafi in spirit. He even asked me to listen to Roja TV and Radio, one 
of important Salafi media in Indonesia, in order to know more about 
Al-Irsyad’s views. Secondly, he holds an important roles in Salafi 
communities where he is often invited as speakers and preachers. 
Yusuf himself did not object to be called a Salafi, but he did not like to 
be called a ‘Wahhabi’. This might be because the term Salafi sounds 
more positive than Wahhabi as the latter has become identical with the 
followers of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab’, themselves perceived 
negatively as radicals and even terrorists.   
On negative note, Yusuf’s arguments indicate that he 
misunderstood the modernist characters of Al-Irsyad laid down by 
Ahmad Surkati. His Salafi outlook led him to only pick up purification 
aspect of Al-Irsyad’s doctrine and ignored its modern aspect such as 
upholding egalitarianism and the compatibility between Islam and 
modernity. His failure in understanding Al-Irsyad’s modernity led him 
to accuse Geys Amar and his camp as liberal. Geys himself seems to 
follow the footstep of Imam Surkati. He and the old-camp still uphold 
religious purification as one part of Irsyadi identity. The recent manual 
of the old-camp even regards Islamic liberalism as the challenge of Al-
Irsyad besides conservative Salafism. However, the major problem of 
Geys lied in his too long-serving leadership and his failure to 
accommodate young Irsyadis’ aspiration in developing the organisation 
and their schools. Instead, he exaggerated the danger of Salafi-
influenced Irsyadis and blamed them as the source of the 
organisation’s decline. 
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Conclusion         
This paper has examined the internal dynamics within the 
Hadhrami community from the colonial era till the present Indonesia. 
It concludes that the conflicts within Hadhrami community shifted 
from Hadhrami traditional stratification to Islamic doctrine. The 
coming of a new religious belief that challenges the privilege and 
authority of religious elites leads to a tension and division between the 
groups. In colonial era, Hadhrami community was consolidated in an 
attempt to gain equality and modern education (Hadhrami awakening) 
in the Netherland East Indies. This was inspired by Chinese awakening 
embodied in the foundation of modern associations and schools. This 
was also a response to a discriminative policy of the colonial Dutch 
that categorized the Arabs in the second class after Europeans. 
Following Hadhrami tradition, Hadhramis gave a privilege to sayyid 
group who was at the top strata of traditional hierarchy in their 
homeland. As the descendants of the Prophet, they enjoyed special 
treatment from other Hadhrami groups and local Muslims in the form 
of hand-kissing.  However, the coming of recruited teacher from 
Mecca, Syekh Ahmad Surkati, who spread views of Islamic reformism, 
challenged the sayyid group. The reformist idea, which was adopted 
from Egypt thinkers, campaigned for egalitarianism (musāwa) among 
Muslims irrespective of their nationalities, class, and lineages. The 
challenge on the Hadhrami stratification finally divided the community 
into two organisations: Jamiat Khair and Al-Irsyad. Most of the non-
sayyids who favor Islamic reformism joint the latter group. The Indies-
born Hadhrami, however, fed up with the conflict between their 
parents. They sought to unite Hadhramis from different groups and 
called them to consider Indonesia as their motherland. Their 
movement became tangible with the foundation of Indonesian Arab 
Union (PAI) where most of its members were muwallad (diaspora-
born). This movement created a new division among Hadhramis, 
especially between the wulāyati and muwallad members of PAI. This 
division, however, ended after the independence of Indonesia.      
In the post-independence Indonesia, especially after 1980s, the 
new challenge has come again to the two Hadhrami groups. The rising 
globalisation avenues have facilitated the flowing of ideas and funding 
from the Middle East to Indonesia. The ideas of transnational Islamic 
movements such as Salafism and Shi’ism had been spreading among 
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university students since 1980s and later gained freedom to establish 
various organisations after Soeharto era. Like other Indonesian 
Muslims, some young generations of Hadhramis were interested in the 
movements and join them. The charisma of Khomeini and his 
successful revolution attracted young sayyids to study in Iran and later 
converted to Shi’ism. This conversion struck the sayyid community 
which generally follows Sunni theology and Shafi’i legal school. Several 
conservative habaib emerged and addressed criticism to Shi’a sayyids 
and those moderate scholars, including habaib, who promote dialogue 
between the two groups. They assert Sunnism as the identity of sayyids 
and Indonesian Muslims. In this respect, traditional Sunnism becomes 
a solidarity rope among sayyids.   
In the case of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah, the conflict has happened in 
organisational level. The conflict was driven by doctrinal contestation 
between old-modernist and young conservative camp. The conflict was 
triggered by the reshuffle of several executive members by the long-
service leader Geys Amar in 1998. Amar regarded the members as 
Salafi intruders who injected conservatism among Irsyadis. The 
conflict finally divides the organisation into two: Al-Irsyad Al-
Islamiyah and Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad. The former group claims to 
maintain Al-Irsyad from conservative Salafi influences while the latter 
group claims to revive the glory of the organisation through more 
assertive religious observance and more professional management. The 
key leaders were educated in the Saudi-funded Salafi educational 
institutions and were largely influenced by Salafism. They are cast as 
Wahhabi group trying to bring radical Islam into the organisation. In 
the meantime, the conservative camp views the old-modernist as 
liberal and pluralist and, hence, deviated from the true principle of Al-
Irsyad (mabadi). The two groups have competed for Irsyadi authority 
by selecting and reasserting the doctrinal principles of Al-Irsyad.  
The new dynamics within Hadhrami community suggest that they 
have integrated in the broader landscape of Indonesian Muslims. The 
issue of conflict in the community is no longer imported from Yemen, 
but it emerges from what has been contested among Indonesian 
Muslims. The conflicts over Shi’ism and Salafi-Wahhabism, for 
instance, have occurred not only within Hadhrami community, but 
also within Indonesian Muslims as well. This is certainly connected to 
the changing development in the country where various Muslim 
groups from overseas, especially after the fall of Soeharto regime, have 
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emerged and competed for Islamic authority in the public sphere. In 
this process, the encounter of transnational Islamic doctrines, be it 
from the Saudi Arabia or Iran, with the long-established local Islam 
have led to tensions and conflicts within Indonesian Muslims. [] 
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